This paper reports estimates of the effects of the Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) and 504 loan programs on employment. The database links a complete list of all SBA loans in these programs to universal data on all employers in the U.S. economy from 1976 to 2010. Our method is to estimate firm fixed effect regressions using matched control groups for the SBA loan recipients we have constructed by matching exactly on firm age, industry, year, and pre-loan size, plus kernel-based matching on propensity scores estimated as a function of four years of employment history and other variables. The results imply positive average effects on loan recipient employment of about 25 percent or 3 jobs at the mean. Including loan amount, we find little or no impact of loan receipt per se, but an increase of about 5.4 jobs for each million dollars of loans. Examining loans received only in high growth county-years (average growth of 22 percent), where most small firms should have excellent growth potential, we find similar effects, implying that the estimates are not driven by differential demand conditions across firms. Results are also similar regardless of distance of control from recipient firms, suggesting only a very small role for displacement effects. In all these cases, the results pass a "pre-program" specification test, where controls and treated firms look similar in the pre-loan period. Other specifications, such as those using only matching or only regression imply somewhat higher effects, but they fail the pre-program test.
indicator is unclear, it seems to be based on summing up the borrowers' statements on loan applications concerning their intentions to create or retain jobs.
Our research aims to contribute to the evaluation of these employment impacts by using much better data than were heretofore available and by applying recent econometric methods developed for estimating causal effects with such data. We link administrative data on every SBA 7(a) and 540 program loan to long-panel data on the universe of employers in the U.S. economy, and we used the linked data to implement a longitudinal matching estimator (e.g., Heckman et al., 1997 Heckman et al., , 1998 . The annual panels in our data run from 1976 to 2010 and permit us to select comparator firms based on age, industry, and several years of employment history, to control for time and firm-fixed effects, and to measure the evolution of employment before and after the loans were awarded. We use multiple control groups, differentiated by distance from the loan-recipients, to assess possible general equilibrium (displacement) effects of the loans.
The paper builds on previous research on small business, finance, and government policy in several ways. Much of the recent small business controversy in the U.S. has actually not concerned policy directly, but rather the empirical relationship between business size and employment growth. Birch's (1987) claim that small businesses were responsible for most job creation is widely cited as the basis for government programs supporting this sector, although the underlying methods have been questioned by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996 (see also Neumark, Wall, and Zhang 2011, and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda forthcoming) . But the size-growth relationship is a different issue from the impact of the programs on business growth and performance, which is the question relevant for policy and the one we address in this paper.
Evaluating the effects of SBA loans on job creation is also related to macroeconomic debates on the size of the government spending multiplier (e.g., Ramey 2011) . As in this paper, some of the recent literature on that question uses micro-data (e.g., Parker 2011 and Parker et al. 2011) . Our analysis of potential displacement effects is relevant for the question whether government spending merely reallocates resources across economic agents or whether it also has an aggregate effect.
Finally, the paper is relevant for the broader theoretical and empirical literature on finance and growth (Levine 2005) . As emphasized in Beck's (2011) review of the econometric research, a standard identification problem in that literature is determining the direction of causality between growth and finance, and despite a long list of empirical studies, the degree to which financial development promotes economic growth remains controversial. Most studies use aggregate (typically country-level) data. Those using firm-level data frequently employ country-level measures of financial development, because of the difficulty of measuring financial constraints at the firm level; see the controversy over the approach of analyzing the relationship between investment and cash flow (Hubbard 1998) . By contrast, in this paper we are able to analyze a specific policy intervention varying at the firm level, which may be a unique contribution to this literature. 4 Section 2 describes the SBA programs we analyze. Section 3 describes the data, including the several matched control samples. Section 4 outlines our evaluation methodology. Section 5 provides results, and Section 6 concludes the paper with a summary of results and caveats.
SBA Loan Programs
The SBA has several small business loan guarantee programs. SBA 7A loans not part of a special subprogram can be for an amount up to $5 million, with a maximum 85 percent SBA guarantee for loans up to $150,000, and a 75 percent maximum guarantee for higher amounts. 5 They are term loans that can be used for expansion/renovation; new construction; purchase of land, buildings, equipment, fixtures, and lease-hold improvements; working capital; debt refinancing for compelling reasons; seasonal line of credit; and inventory. Maturity depends on the ability to repay. Usually loans for working capital and machinery (not to exceed the life of equipment) have a maturity of 5-10 years, while loans for purchase of real estate can have a term up to 25 years. The SBA sets maximum loan interest rates, which decrease with loan amount and increase with maturity. Since December 8, 2004 SBA has charged a guaranty fee, which increases with maturity and loan amount. To qualify, a business must be for-profit; meet SBA size standards; 6 show good character, 7 management expertise, and a feasible business plan; not have funds available from other sources; 8 and be an eligible type of business.
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The loan application is sent by the SBA to an independent entity for analysis.
Some 7A programs are more streamlined. Unlike with other 7A loans, in the 7A Preferred Lender Program (PLP) the SBA delegates the final credit decision and most servicing and liquidation authority to PLP lenders. 10 The SBA's role is to check loan eligibility criteria. The SBA selects lenders for PLP status based on their past record with the SBA, including proficiency in processing and servicing SBA-guaranteed loans. In payment default cases, the PLP lender agrees to liquidate all business assets before asking the SBA to honor its guaranty.
In the 7A Certified Lender Program (CLP), the SBA promises a loan decision within three working days on applications handled by CLP lenders.
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Rather than ordering an independently conducted analysis, the SBA conducts a credit review, relying on the credit knowledge of the lender's loan officers. Lenders with a good performance history with SBA loans may receive CLP status.
5 See http://www.sba.gov/content/7a-terms-conditions. 6 The cut-offs for being a small business vary by NAICS industry. In some industries the criterion is the average number of employees, with a cut-off ranging from 50 to 1,500. In other industries it is average annual receipts, ranging from $750,000 to $35.5 million. For many types of financial institutions, the cut-off is $175 million in assets. See http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf. 7 The principals of each applicant firm provide a "Statement of Personal History", which the SBA uses to determine if they have shown a willingness and ability to pay their debts and abide by their community's laws. See http://www.sba.gov/content/standard-7a-evaluation-criteria. 8 A review is made of both business and personal financial resources. When these resources are deemed excessive, the business is required to use them in place of part or all of the requested loan proceeds. See http://www.sba.gov/content/standard-7a-evaluation-criteria. In the lender's application for an SBA guaranty, the lender must sign the following statement "Without the participation of SBA to the extent applied for, we would not be willing to make this loan, and in our opinion the financial assistance applied for is not otherwise available on reasonable terms." See http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/SBA%20FORM%202301%20B.pdf. 9 This includes engaging in, or proposing to engage in, business in the United States or its possessions; possessing reasonable owner equity to invest; and using alternative financial resources, including personal assets, before seeking financial assistance. See http://www.sba.gov/content/7a-eligibility. 10 See http://www.sba.gov/content/steps-participating-plp. 11 See http://www.sba.gov/content/steps-participating-clp. SBA 7A Express loans have a $350,000 maximum loan amount and 50 percent maximum SBA guaranty.
12 Interest rates can be higher than on other 7A loans. Qualified lenders may be granted authorization by the SBA to make eligibility determinations. The SBA promises a decision within 36 hours.
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The 504 Loan Program offers loan guarantees up to $5 million or $5.5 million, depending on the type of business.
14 Typically a lender covers 50 percent of the project costs without an SBA guarantee, a Certified Development Company (CDC) certified by the SBA provides up to 40 percent of the financing (100 percent guaranteed by an SBA-guaranteed debenture), and the borrower contributes at least 10 percent (the borrower is sometimes required to contribute up to 20 percent). CDCs are nonprofit corporations promoting community economic development via disbursement of 504 loans. Proceeds may be used for fixed assets or to refinance debt in connection with an expansion of the business via new or renovated assets. For-profit businesses with tangible net worth of no more than $15 million and average income of no more than $5 million after federal income taxes in the two years prior to application are eligible. Businesses must create or retain one job per $65,000 guaranteed by the SBA, with the exception of small manufacturers, which must create or retain one job per $100,000.
Data
We use a database on all 7A and 504 loans guaranteed by the SBA from inception in 1953 through 2009 to identify loan recipients, amounts, and time of receipt. We convert the SBA-approved loan amounts to real 2010 prices using the annual average Consumer Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 15 Loan timing is based on the date the SBA approved the loan. In order to exclude any firms receiving a disaster loan before their first 7A or 504 loan from the analysis, we also use a database on all SBA disaster loans from inception through 2009. We have matched the SBA 7A, 504, and disaster loan data to the Census Bureau's employer and non-employer business registers using the following passes: The first is an exact match on 5-digit zip code, exact match on standardized street address, and exact match on standardized business name. For those unobservations unmatched after this pass, the second pass is an exact match on 3-digit zip code, a standardized street address soundex (phonetic algorithm), and an exact match on standardized business name. The third pass is an exact match on 5-digit zip code, all of street address allowing for some fuzziness (70 percent sensitivity in SAS's DQMATCH software), and business name allowing for some fuzziness. The fourth pass is an exact match on 5-digit zip code and business name allowing for some fuzziness; and the fifth pass is place (city) soundex, business name allowing for some fuzziness, street name allowing for some fuzziness, and street number allowing for some fuzziness. A match from the first pass is prioritized over the second pass, which is prioritized over the third pass, etc. In a 12 See http://www.sba.gov/content/become-express-lender and http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/ Loan%20Chart%20Baltimore%20June%202012%20Version%202.pdf. 13 There are several other smaller 7A programs not described here. See http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/ Loan%20Chart%20Baltimore%20June%202012%20Version%202.pdf. 14 See http://www.sba.gov/content/cdc504-loan-program. 15 This can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. first series of passes, the SBA data are matched to business registers from the same year as the loan. Then they are matched to business registers in the subsequent year, and finally to business registers in the previous year.
The Potential biases can result from the fact that not all single-establishment employer businesses receiving a SBA loan after start-up are included in the regression analysis. To get some feel for the nature of the possible bias, in Table 2 we display descriptive statistics from the SBA loan applications for four different samples: those reporting to be an existing business and not matched to any business register, those not in the regressions due to missing employment in the year prior to the loan, those not in the regressions because no suitable control firms have been found, and the main regression sample. Those not matched to business registers or which are missing LBD employment tend to be smaller firms relative to those in the regressions, and more of them are minority-owned and sole proprietorships or partnerships. In contrast, fewer 16 They can be downloaded at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/gazetteer/gazette.html. 17 Among loans issued to firms identifying themselves on the loan application as existing businesses, the match rate is somewhat higher, at 59.26 percent. 18 We drop loans issued to an entity that is part of a multi-establishment firm in the loan year or any earlier year. Though the effects of SBA loans on multi-establishment firms and start-ups are of interest, they require different identification methods, so we leave them for future research. 19 We limit the analysis to the first loan, as subsequent SBA loans could be influenced by the first loan's effect. 20 The first 504 loans were issued in 1986. Our identification methods require at least one year of data prior to receipt of the loan, and the LBD starts in 1976, necessitating dropping 7A loans prior to 1977. recipients without suitable control firms are minority-owned or sole proprietorships or partnerships, and they are generally larger. More of those without controls are in manufacturing and fewer are in construction or services. There are nearly nine times as many loans in the not matched to any business register and missing LBD employment groups as there are in the group without suitable controls, so overall, the regression sample has higher average employment than the other groups. This may affect the results if loan effects vary with firm size (a topic of future research). Table 3 shows descriptive statistics using variables from the LBD for those SBA firms matched to it (called treated firms), as well as all other LBD firms (excluding multiestablishment firms and those ever in a multi-establishment firm in the past). The standard deviation of employment for firms not receiving SBA loans (i.e., non-treated firms) is much larger, reflecting the fact that large firms are ineligible for SBA programs. Treated firm median employment is higher and mean employment is about the same as for non-treated firms, however, suggesting that SBA loan recipients tend to be larger firms within the small business sector. Treated firms are younger on average. More treated firms are in manufacturing and wholesale and retail trade compared to non-treated firms. These differences could affect employment growth, so a simple comparison of treated and non-treated firm employment growth is likely to be misleading.
Methods
Our goal is to analyze whether there is a causal effect of SBA loan receipt on employment. Let { } indicate whether firm i receives an SBA loan in year t, and let be employment at time t+s, , following loan receipt. The employment of the firm if it hadn't received a loan is . The loan's causal effect for firm i at time t+s is defined as . The value of is not observable, however. We define the average effect of treatment on the treated as { } { } { }. A counterfactual of the last term, i.e., the average employment outcome of loan recipients had they not received a loan, can be estimated using the average employment of non-recipients, { }. This approximation is valid as long as there are no uncontrolled contemporaneous effects correlated with loan receipt. To help control for such contemporaneous effects, we use matching techniques to select a control group.
We have taken the following steps to select a control group for the employment regression sample. As mentioned in Section 3 above, we limit our treated sample to firms in the LBD that have been single-establishment firms since birth, ones that are at least one year old when receiving their first SBA loan, those receiving their first SBA 7A or 504 loan in 1977-2009, those not receiving a SBA disaster loan prior to their first 7A or 504 loan, with nonmissing employment in the LBD in the year before loan receipt, and with no employment outliers in the LBD throughout the 1976-2010 period. 21 To be eligible to be a candidate control firm for a particular treated firm, a firm must have non-missing employment in the year prior to the treated firm's loan receipt (which also means it isn't a new start-up in the year of loan receipt) and no employment outliers in the LBD; it can never have received an SBA 7A, 504, or disaster loan at any time between 1953-2010; it can never have been a part of a multiestablishment firm through the year of loan receipt for the treated firm; it must be in the same four-digit industry (this is the four-digit SIC code through 2001 and the first four digits of the NAICS code in 2002-2009) in the treated firm's loan receipt year, be in the same firm age category (1-2 years old, 3-5 years old, 6-10 years old, and 11 or more years old) in the treated firm's loan receipt year, be in the same firm employment category (1 employee, 2-4 employees, 5-9 employees, 10-19 employees, 20-49 employees, 50-99 employees, and 100 or more employees) in the year before the treated firm's loan receipt year. Among firms with nine or fewer employees in the previous year, we also require the candidate control firm to be located in the same state (firms with 1-9 employees are much more numerous than ones with more than nine employees, so we can afford to impose more restrictions on this group). In addition, we impose a restriction that the ratio of the treated firm's employment in the previous year to the control firm's previous year employment be greater than 0.9 and less than 1.1. This means that among firms with nine or fewer employees, employment must match exactly.
There are other variables that we would like to match on besides age category, industry, employment in the year before treatment, and treatment year, but it is difficult to design matching thresholds for each variable separately, so we reduce this dimensionality problem by doing propensity score matching. We estimate probit regressions using the sample of treated firms and their candidate controls. 22 A dummy for SBA 7A or 504 loan receipt is regressed on the log of employment in the year prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; the square of the log of employment in the year prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; the log of employment one year before minus log employment two years prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; the log of employment two years before minus log employment three years prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; the log of employment three years before minus log employment four years prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; the log of payroll/number of employees in the year prior to the treated firm's loan receipt; firm age; firm age squared; and year dummies. We also include dummies for missing values for the log of employment two years before minus log employment three years prior to the treated firm's loan receipt, the log of employment three years before minus log employment four years prior to the treated firm's loan receipt, and the log of payroll/number of employees in the year prior to the treated firm's loan receipt.
23 21 We define the following cases as outliers: an employment increase or decrease of more than ten times between the first and second year of life or the second-to-last and last year of life; or an employment increase (decrease) of more than five times followed in the next year by an employment decrease (increase) of more than five times. 22 Treated firms with no candidate controls are dropped at this point. 23 When a firm has a missing value for one of these variables, a zero is imputed.
The treated firm observations in the probit regressions are each assigned a weight of ( ) , where N is the total number of firms in the regression and R is the number of treated firms in the regression. The non-treated firms are assigned a weight of 1. This equalizes the total weight of the treated firm and non-treated firm groups. The purpose of this weighting is to produce propensity scores that span a wider range, centered around 0.5 rather than near zero. We limit the treated and non-treated firms in the employment regression analysis to ones within a common support, meaning that no propensity score of a treated (non-treated) firm that we use is higher than the highest non-treated (treated) firm propensity score, and no propensity score of a treated (non-treated) firm that we use is lower than the lowest non-treated (treated) firm propensity score. A non-treated firm is included as a control for a particular treated firm if the ratio of the treated to the non-treated firm's propensity score is at least 0.95 and not more than 1.05. Treated firms with no controls meeting all these criteria are not included in the employment regression analysis. Non-treated firms appear in the employment regressions as many times as they have treated firms to which they are matched (i.e., this is matching with replacement). Kernel weights are applied to the controls. 24 In the employment regressions, each control is assigned a final weight of their kernel weight divided by the sum of the kernel weights for all controls for a particular treated firm, and the treated firm is given a weight of 1. As a result, the treated firm and all its control firms together receive equal weight. Propensity score matching relies on a strong assumption of "selection on observables". Since our data are longitudinal, we are also able to eliminate unobserved, time-invariant differences in employment through difference-in-differences (DID) regression specifications.
The employment regression specifications take the following form: , where i indexes firms from 1 to I, j indexes from 1 to R the treated firms to which the firm is a control, 25 and t indexes the years from 1 to T. is a 1 x 66 vector of event time dummies. Designating τ as the index of event time, the number of years since the treated firm received its first SBA loan, such that in the pre-loan years, in the year of loan receipt, and in the post-loan years.
26 is a 1 x 35 vector of year dummies, is a fixed effect for each firm for each treated firm to which it is matched, and is an idiosyncratic error. 27 In alternative specifications, is the firm's employment and the natural logarithm of the firm's employment. 24 The kernel weight is (
) , where tr is a subscript for the treated firm, and ntr is a subscript for the non-treated firm. 25 For treated firms, i=j. 26 These event time dummies, which are sometimes non-zero for all firms, in conjunction with , which are sometimes non-zero only for treated firms, are necessary to make these DID regressions. 27 The standard errors are cluster-adjusted by firm. We have also bootstrapped some specifications, and the standard errors are similar to those reported here. is a vector of SBA loan treatment measures, and are the loan treatment effects of interest. We estimate several alternative specifications of . The simplest specifications include a post-loan dummy, which for treated firms is equal to 1 in the year after receipt of the first SBA loan and in all subsequent years. Others include the post-loan dummy interacted with the amount of the first SBA loan, expressed in $thousands, or the post-loan dummy interacted with the difference between the logarithm of the loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the regression.
28 Some specifications include both post-loan dummies and their interactions with loan amount or the difference between the log loan amount and the mean, and some also include squared terms for the loan amount or the difference between the log loan amount and the mean. We also estimate dynamic specifications including treated-firm-specific dummy variables for the years before and after first SBA loan receipt. For treated firms, these dummy variables take on identical values to the event time dummies described above, while for non-treated control firms, they are always zero. Table 4 shows the number of treated firms, number of control firm-treated firm combinations, the number of pre-treatment and post-treatment firm-years for treated firms, and the number of pre-treatment and post-treatment years for control firm-treated firm combinations. On average there are several years of data on each treated and control firm before and after treatment, the former facilitating control for pre-treatment differences, and the latter allowing us to study long-run treatment effects. Note that treated firms have more post-treatment years on average, which indicates a higher survival propensity.
The reliability of propensity score matching depends on whether, conditional on the propensity score, the potential outcomes and are independent of treatment incidence. The assumption of independence conditional on observables depends on the pre-treatment variables being balanced between the treated and control groups. We evaluate this in two ways -by performing a standardized difference (or bias) test for the main variables included in the matching probit regressions, and by analyzing the pre-treatment event-time dynamics (see Section 5). Table 5 reports the means of the main variables included in the matching probit regressions for four different samples: all treated firms, all non-treated firms, treated firms included in the employment regressions, and controls included in the employment regressions. Treated firm employment and average wage are substantially larger than for non-treated firms prior to matching, and treated firms experience more employment growth in the four years prior to treatment. After matching, these differences are negligible. The standardized difference measures confirm this: employment, employment growth, and wage biases are reduced by over 89 percent, while age bias is reduced by 38 percent.
29 None of the biases are close to being large after matching.
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28 If a firm received multiple SBA loans in the year, the loan amounts are combined. 29 The mean age is very similar in the total treated and total non-treated samples, leaving little scope for improvement through matching. 30 Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) consider a value of 20 to be large. Table 6 contains basic results for specifications with log(employment) as the dependent variable. The first column is the simplest difference-in-difference (DiD) specification, where the variable of interest is the Postloan dummy (treatment dummy during the postloan period), and the result implies an average effect of about 25 percent increase in employment associated with receiving the loan. Given that average employment is 13 to 15 in our samples, this implies an average gain of 3-4 jobs in the treated firms relative to an estimated counterfactual of nontreatment. The other columns in Table 6 allow the effect to vary with log(Loan Amount), demeaned in the sample so that the Postloan dummy represents the effect at the sample mean, and the log(Loan Amount) is set to zero for nontreated firms and years. The results suggest that doubling Loan Amount increases employment by about one job, with some concavity in the estimated relationship. This result bears much more analysis, however, as it may well reflect heterogeneous loan effects by firm size, which is likely correlated with loan size, a topic in our plans for future research.
Results
Next we study the dynamics of loan effects on employment in event time. As described in the previous section, we can estimate separate effects by years normalized around the loan year. Grouping together all years five and more years before the loan as the base period (a normalization is necessary because of the inclusion of firm fixed effects), we permit the estimated coefficient to vary for each year from four years before to 10+ years after the loan. Examining the dynamics of the estimates prior to the loan provides a Heckman-Hotz (1989) "pre-program test" of the specification: if we observe large differences between the treated and control firms prior to the loan, and particularly if we observe differing trends, then this would be symptomatic of selection bias, even conditioning on our matching and regression procedures. Concerning the postloan period, the results in Table 6 assume a constant loan effect in the postloan period, but an interesting question is whether the estimate is averaging an initial jump in employment that falls later on, or whether the employment gain is sustained in the longer term. Figure 2 contains the results from estimating these dynamics. We observe only tiny differences between the treated and control firms in the preloan period. There is a slight tendency for worse performance of treated relative to control firms: compared to five years and more before the loan, employment falls about 3 percent in treated firms relative to controls. But this difference is trivial compared with the big jumps we estimate in the loan year and year following: about 20 percent total. The jump in the loan year may be explained by anticipatory hiring or receipt of the loan early in the calendar year, but it certainly marks a dramatic change in employment trend relative to the preloan period. After two years, the rate of growth diminishes, but the estimates imply it never falls over the 10+ year period we observe. An interpretation of these results is that the SBA loan, rather than crowding out alternative sources of finance, may "crowd in" by making it possible for firms to develop a credit history and gain regular access to formal financial markets.
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The log specification in Table 6 has the advantages that the range of both the dependent variable and loan size variable are constrained, the relationship is assumed proportionate rather than absolute, and problems of heteroskedasticity are mitigated. While lacking these advantages, the unlogged specification permits more direct estimates of the effects of receiving an SBA-31 A potentially important issue here is the effect of different terms of the SBA-backed loans, which indeed seem to vary widely. Whether employment falls after the loan term expires would be interesting to investigate as a further piece of evidence on the "crowding-in" hypothesis, and we plan to address this in future research. backed loan and of receiving different loan amounts on the number of jobs created. Table 7 therefore contains corresponding results with unlogged employment as dependent variable and Loan Amount expressed in millions of dollars. The simple DiD result in the first column implies a gain of 3 jobs from loan receipt, averaged over the whole sample. The other columns again permit the effect to vary with Loan Amount. Column (2) shows that including Loan Amount reduces the coefficient on Postloan Dummy to a quarter of its previous magnitude (in column (1)), statistically insignificantly different from zero, and the magnitude declines still further in the quadratic specification in column (3) to the tiny value of 0.20. This implies that the employment gain from loan receipt is associated only with the amount of the loan, not with selection into the treatment group, evidence that our matching procedures may be working to reduce selection bias in the estimates. Indeed, in the final quartic specification, in column (4), the Postloan dummy coefficient is actually negative, which taken literally would imply negative selection into the SBA loan programs.
The coefficients on Loan Amount imply an increase of 5 in employment associated with each one million dollars of loans, again with some slight concavity in the relationship between employment and the size of the loan. As in the analysis of Table 6 , this result requires further examination in the context of possible heterogeneity of loan effects with respect to size and other firm characteristics. Leaving aside these heterogeneity issues, we can make two rough calculations of job creation due to SBA loans, in both cases assuming the coefficients in Table 7 , estimated over the period of 1976-2010 can be applied to the "$30 billion in lending support to 60,000 small businesses" in fiscal year 2011. The first uses the specification in column (1) to multiply the Postloan dummy coefficient of 3.074 increase in employment per loan times the 60,000 small businesses receiving loans to obtain an estimate of 184,440. The second uses column (2) and multiplies 60,000 by 0.708 (=42,480) and 30 billion*0.0054/1000 (=162,000) for a total of 204,480. The two estimates are rather close, and although they are significantly less than the claimed half-million or more "jobs created and retained" by the SBA, they are not in a different order of magnitude.
The basic identifying assumption in these estimates is that the combination of matching and regression methods has eliminated unobserved differences in demand for loans by firms that are correlated with differences in their growth potential. If this assumption is invalid, then it might be the case that the effects we estimate reflect selection bias in which types of firms are loan recipients. Note that the inclusion of firm fixed effects in our regressions imply that such a residual selection bias must be time-varying, and indeed the dynamics results presented above, in Figure 2 , imply that there would have to be a demand shock, a jump in growth potential, exactly in the loan year and following year. Any other form of selection bias, such as a more rapid trend growth rate prior to loan receipt, would have been reflected as such in Figure 2 .
One way of assessing this potential problem of time-varying demand shocks is to focus on situations where all firms face a strong increase in demand and thus have good growth possibilities. For this purpose, we focus on unusually rapid growth environments -cases located in county-years in the top decile of county-level employment growth rates over the whole sample; the average employment growth in these cases is 22.2 percent, and the minimum is 11.5 percent -compared with a county-year average of 0.18 percent. We restrict both the treated firms and controls to come from these unusually high growth situations. If the loan receipt is just reflecting a greater opportunity for growth among treated firms, then the estimate with this highgrowth-context sample should be zero, or at least attenuated compared to the full sample estimates in Tables 6 and 7 . The results shown in Table 8 , however, are rather similar to those for the full data: slightly larger for the coefficient on Postloan in the log(employment) equation, and slightly smaller in other specifications. The dynamics of the Postloan coefficient in loanevent time, shown in Figure 3 , are also qualitatively similar, with only tiny differences in treated and control firms prior to loan receipt and large sustained jumps immediately afterward. Because this sample is smaller, the 99 percent confidence intervals are wider, of course. Overall, there is no evidence from this analysis that differences in demand conditions drive our results.
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Our methods are designed to estimate the "treatment effect on the treated"(ToT), the direct effect on firms receiving loans, and they assume the program has no effect on nontreated firms used as controls in the analysis. 33 Because only a tiny fraction of firms in the U.S. receive SBA-backed loans, this assumption is plausible. But it is nevertheless possible that even if treated firms grow as a result of loan receipt that the program creates general equilibrium effects, or spillovers on other firms. The most obvious type of potential spillover would be negative: displacement effects that reduce employment at nontreated firms that compete with the treated in product and labor markets. Spillover effects could in principle also be positive, for instance if the loan enables innovation that is somehow copied or imitated by other firms, and it could also be positive for firms in upstream or downstream industries from the loan beneficiary. In either case, the total job creation -including these indirect effects as well as the direct effect -would differ from the direct effect we have estimated.
Estimating such general equilibrium effects is intrinsically difficult, and it is largely ignored in the program evaluation literature. Positive spillovers would imply that our estimates of the direct effect are lower than the total estimate, and therefore we focus attention here on the possibility of negative displacement effects. If these result from product market competition, where loan receipt gives the beneficiary an advantage over its competitors, then we should look for negative effects within industries. If the degree of competition is related to geographic distance, then we should look for larger negative effects nearer to treated firms than farther away. In turn, this implies that the estimated ToT should be larger when the controls are drawn from close by than when they are far away.
To assess this implication, we divide the controls within the kernel bandwidth according to the distance from treated firm and estimate separately for nearby and far away controls. We implement this procedure two different ways: in the first, controls are included if they are up to 10 miles away to constitute the "nearby" group, which is compared to a "far away" group more than 200 miles distant; in the second procedure, we simply take the nearest four controls for the "nearby" group and the furthest four as "far away." The displacement hypothesis would predict that we receive larger estimates for the nearby group than the far away group. Results are shown in Table 10 and dynamics in Figure 4 . In all cases, we find only slightly larger nearby coefficients implying at most a small amount of displacement -on the order of 1-2 percentage points of employment effect or 0.1-0.2 jobs from the unlogged specification, on average per loan. Thus, while the analysis is consistent with displacement, the estimated magnitudes are so small that they do not support an important role for displacement in driving our results. 34 32 An alternative approach would be to consider the control group in rapidly growing contexts as a placebo, or "pseudo-outcome" group, and to test the difference in their growth compared to controls in less rapidly growing contexts. We plan to report such tests, which can be implemented in various ways, in future research. 33 The program evaluation literature sometimes refers to this as the "stable unit treatment value assumption" (SUTVA) (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009) . 34 An alternative approach would have been to estimate the difference between the loan impacts on nearby and faraway controls in a single regression excluding the treated firms, akin to the pseudo-outcome test discussed above. In fact, based on the linearity of least squares regression, we can infer the results from such an exercise at least The analysis so far assumes no differences in survival rates between treated firms and controls, although the SBA frequently refers to business survival as a performance measure, and access to loans may well affect survival. The direction of the effect is not entirely certain, because while more finance may get a business through hard times, the increased leverage and possible over-extension may create greater vulnerability. Nor is the measurement of survival unambiguous, as we can only track firms in the LBD and must classify any disappearance from the database as an exit. Though great effort has been made to link establishments across time in the LBD, we cannot always distinguish bankruptcy and other genuine shutdowns from buy-outs or reorganizations that lead to a change in the identifying code in the LBD. As some of these outcomes represent business failure, others reflect success, and some level of exit is a normal feature of a dynamic economy, the analysis of exit is thus also not as clear normatively as our analysis of employment effects.
With these qualifications in mind, we are nonetheless interested to ascertain the degree to which our results might be driven by exit effects. Assuming exit represents job loss, then if exit is more common among loan recipients, then our earlier results are overstated in ignoring the employment decline associated with exit. On the other hand, if SBA-backed loans raise survival, then our earlier results could be understated. To distinguish these alternatives, we impute a zero value for employment in every year following exit and re-estimate the specifications in Table 7 (because zero values are included here, we cannot re-estimate Table 6 ). The results are slightly larger but qualitatively similar to those without the imputations, so we conclude that different patterns of exit are unlikely to play an important role in our results.
Finally, we consider some alternative estimation approaches. Tables 12 and 13 provide  analogous results to Tables 6 and 7 for the logged and unlogged specifications, respectively, using a 2 percent propensity score bandwidth for the inclusion of controls. The sample is much smaller, both because there are fewer controls, but also because some treated firms fail to find controls within the narrower bandwidth that also satisfy the exact year, age, industry, and preloan size restrictions. The results, however, are qualitatively similar. Figure 5 provides the corresponding loan dummy dynamics to Figure 2 , again with similar implications.
We may consider some approaches that do not use matching or regression, or either. Table 14 shows mean employment levels pre-and post-treatment for the treated sample and for all non-treated firms. The latter are about 35 percent smaller compared to post-treatment loan recipients, but this cannot be interpreted causally because they also differ pre-treatment. If we consider a matching estimator without regression adjustments, we can calculate the simple difference-in-differences in the bottom part of Table 14 , where treated-control differences are smaller pre-treatment, and the change is much greater to the post-treatment period. A plot of these employment levels for the treated and matched controls is shown in Figure 6 for the mean and in Figure 7 for the median. But without regression adjustment, including fixed effects, there is still some unobserved heterogeneity reflected in the pre-treatment differences and not accounted for.
Two other alternative estimators that use regression but not matching include an afterbefore estimator using only treated firms, but no control group, and one that includes all nonroughly from the results in Table 10 : assuming identical samples for the nearby and far-away groups (which is almost exactly satisfied for the nearest 4 versus furthest 4), the coefficient on a nearby dummy variable would be equal to the difference between the coefficient shown for the far-away group minus the coefficient shown for the nearby group in the table. For the Postloan dummy specifications, this subtraction gives the magnitudes of displacement discussed in the text. treated firms as controls. Results for the first of these are shown in Tables 15 and 16 . They tend to imply larger loan effects than those in our preferred specifications using a matched control group in Tables 6 and 7. For the full-LBD regressions, results are shown in Tables 17 and 18 , the coefficients are still (slightly) larger. We can diagnose potential selection bias in these specifications by estimating dynamics as before, and the results are shown in Figures 8 and 9 for these two specifications. Unlike the dynamics from the matched samples, where we observed only tiny differences between treated and controls in the preloan period, in both Figure 8 and Figure 9 the differences are substantial and trending strongly upward before the event year. They also reach higher peaks in the postloan period, but this analysis implies that the results without matching are plagued by too much selection bias to allow reliable inferences about the impact of these programs.
Conclusion
Our estimates of the effects of the Small Business Administration (SBA) 7(a) and 540 loan programs on employment in this paper are based on an unusual linking of administrative and census data and an application of econometric methods originally designed for evaluating labor market training interventions. This approach appears to be fruitful, as we exploit the large size and completeness of the data to combine matching and regression methods. We match exactly on firm age, industry, year, and pre-loan size, plus we carry out kernel-based matching on propensity scores estimated as a function of four years of employment history and other variables. Having constructed the matched sample, we estimate program effects using firm fixed effects regressions.
The results can be quickly summarized. We find positive average effects on loan recipient employment of about 25 percent or 3 jobs at the mean. Including loan amount, we find little or no impact of loan receipt per se, but an increase of about 5.4 jobs for each million dollars of loans. Examining loans received only in high growth county-years (average growth of 22 percent), where most small firms should have excellent growth potential, we find similar effects, implying that the estimates are not driven by differential demand conditions across firms. Results are also similar regardless of distance of control from recipient firms, suggesting only a very small role for displacement effects. In all these cases, the results pass a "pre-program" specification test, where controls and treated firms look similar in the pre-loan period. Other specifications, such as those using only matching or only regression imply somewhat higher effects, but they fail the pre-program test.
This paper forms the first part of a much larger project in the area of small business programs, finance, innovation, and growth. Our focus here is on a single outcome variable, employment, because job creation has been the central SBA issue and because we can measure this variable over a longer time period and for more firms than other outcomes we plan to study. But the results should be treated as preliminary because heterogeneity in firm size and performance implies that we will likely find considerable heterogeneity in program impacts as well. There are several important dimensions to this heterogeneity, including firm characteristics of size, age, location, and industry; program characteristics such as interest rate, term, and SBA program; and economic environment, including the state of the business cycle. We look forward to reporting these results in the near future. Notes: This excludes multi-establishment firms and establishments that were ever in a multi-establishment firm in the past. Non-treated firms are included in each year they appear in the LBD, while treated firms are included only in the treatment year. For treated firms, employment is measured in the year prior to treatment. The variables come from the LBD. Notes: % bias is the standardized difference, which for a given variable, say age, is
. The all non-treated group is included in all years they appear in the LBD. The other three groups are included only in the treatment year. 
3,404,567
Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the sample. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The loan amounts are in $millions. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the sample. Treated and control firms are included in this sample only if they are located in counties with total employment growth between the year before the treated firm's loan receipt and the year of loan receipt that is in the top decile of employment growth (10.9 percent) among county-year observations in the LBD. Geography is not used for exact matching among treated and control firms in this sample. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The loan amounts are in $millions. Treated and control firms are included in this sample only if they are located in counties with total employment growth between the year before the treated firm's loan receipt and the year of loan receipt that is in the top decile of employment growth (10.9 percent) among county-year observations in the LBD. Geography is not used for exact matching among treated and control firms in this sample. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the sample. The loan amounts are in $millions. The first and second control group is non-treated firms located no more than 10 miles away and more than 200 miles away from the treated firms to which they are matched, respectively. Only treated firms that have controls in both control groups are included in the regressions. The third and fourth control groups are the nearest and furthest four firms from the treated firms to which they are matched. Only treated firms that have at least eight control firms are included in the regressions. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors are cluster-adjusted by firm. The loan amount is in $millions. Zero employment is imputed in all years after exit (i.e., through 2010). Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the sample. Notes: The regressions also include event time dummies common to both treated firms and their matched controls, year dummies, and firm fixed effects (for control firms, there are separate fixed effects for each treated firm to which they are matched). Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The loan amounts are in $millions. Notes: The year of loan receipt is included as a pre-treatment year. The post-treatment years for non-treated firms with matching are the post-treatment years of the treated firms to which the non-treated firms are matched. Notes: The regressions also include year dummies and firm fixed effects. Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount in the sample. 
5,317,759
Notes: The regressions also include year dummies and firm fixed effects. Standard errors, cluster-adjusted by firm, are in parentheses. The log loan amount is the difference between the firm's log loan amount and the mean of the log loan amount among treated firms in the sample. 
